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Inspired by the newly emerging trend that traditional reward crowdfunding platforms start to partner with
equity crowdfunding platforms, I set up a theoretical model using threshold mechanism to study the implica-
tions of such combinations. The model, which uses a simple binary-funder-type and β-distribution based val-
uation system, is able to make several interesting predictions. (1) The creator’s credit constraint will always
be satisfied, and the creator can reap all the ex-ante expected social surplus, reaching a socially optimal result.
(2) The platform offers lower cost of capital and a demand signal. (3) A higher investment cost motivates the
creator to condition her investment choice on a successful observation of her ex-ante expected demand signal.
(4) The creator weights the value from an additional bid against the equity cost of acquiring it when setting
up the optimal threshold. (5) An objectively promising project implies different results than a subjectively
promising one. The creator is likely to set herself up for failure in the latter case. (6) How the creator gives
back the promised equity does not affect the creator’s ex-ante optimal choices or her ex-ante expected util-
ity.
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1 Introduction
At the age of seven when I first learned how big the size of the earth population was, I had
this crazy idea about becoming a millionaire, or even a billionaire, by simply collecting one
penny from everyone else. Unfortunately, I have not yet succeeded carrying out that plan to
this day. One main reason is the realization that I figured as I grew older — regardless of
how small the amount is or how rich they are, people do not like spending their money for
nothing. This recognition, far from discouraging me from holding onto my childhood fantasy,
constantly inspires me to understand and explore the potential power of a huge crowd.
As an ardent Esports follower, I have witnessed my childhood fantasy coming true for the
past few years. Using crowdfunding based on its huge player base, Valve Corporation has
held several record-breaking gaming tournaments in the history of Esports for the last five
years. For example, starting from a base prize pool of 1.6 million dollars, the yearly biggest
tournament of the competitive game Dota 2 ended up with a final prize pool containing
more than 20 million dollars in the year of 20161. In fact, the use of crowdfunding is not
born in modern times. Back in the year of 1783, Mozart offered his manuscripts to whoever
financially backed him for a piano performance in a Viennese concert hall. Other famous
examples include the building of the Statue of Liberty and the Pebble Watch.
Alegre, I., & Moleskis, M. (2016) defined the concept of crowdfunding as ”an alternative
model for project financing, whereby a large and dispersed audience participants through
relatively small financial contributions, in a purposeful project, in exchange for physical,
financial or social rewards. It is usually done via Internet-based platforms that act as a bridge
between the crowd and the projects.” Based on this definition, a typical crowdfunding project
involves three major components. Conforming to the names used by Agrawal, Catalini, and
Goldfarb (2014), I label the projects’ initiators as creators and the projects’ supporters as
funders. The last major component is the crowdfunding platform. With the help of the
internet, almost all the crowdfunding activities nowadays are performed on online platforms.
1For more information, one can visit the site http://dota2.prizetrac.kr/
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Appendix A contains a short list of the leading crowdfunding platforms in North America
and Europe.
Following the terminology used in the literature, I divided the funding strategies adopted
by the platform into four categories: reward, equity, donation, and debt. Reward crowd-
funding can be best understood as the case where funders financially support the creator
in exchange for the product, or more generally, the reward promised by the creator. On an
equity crowdfunding platform, the funders act like venture capitalists except they only put
in a small amount of money and expect to receive some equity shares from the creator if the
project gets initialized. Donation-based crowdfunding platform is self-explanatory, where the
funders support the project without any expectation of receiving anything in return. Lastly,
debt-based crowdfunding platform emerges only recently, where the funder essentially per-
forms as a tiny bank, from which the creator can take small loans if the creator successfully
persuades the funders to support her project. Compared to an equity crowdfunding, the cre-
ators only need to pay back the funders based on a pre-determined interest rate. Intuitively,
one may think the debt-based crowdfunding platform gives more incentive for the creators to
participate, whereas the equity-based crowdfunding offers more motivations for the funders
to be involved.
The third column in the table in Appendix A specifies the initialization rule applied by
the platforms. A fixed funding initialization rule implies the creator can only initialize her
project if the accumulated capitals she is able to raise surpass her pre-determined threshold.
A flexible funding initialization rule indicates that the creator receives whatever amount she
is able to raise during the lifetime of her post and then determines whether to carry out the
project. Intuitively, a flexible funding initialization rule is more susceptible to moral hazard
threat, though such threat is always present under a crowdfunding scheme.
Moritz, A., & Block, J. H. (2016). and Alegre, I., & Moleskis, M. (2016) provided excellent
surveys on the current stage of research in this nascent crowdfunding field. Inspired by the
trend that a lot of reward-based crowdfunding platforms have started a partnership with
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equity-based crowdfunding platforms, and by my reading that few researchers have touched
upon this newly emerging movement, this paper attempts to build up a simple theoretical
model to understand the implications behind such combinations. The simple model adopted
features from Strauzs (2016) model, whereby he studied the issue of moral hazard in reward
crowdfunding, and extended based on his model by assuming the creators are unable to reach
to the entire market at the beginning of her project due to the credit constraint.
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Section 2 sets up the model based on the three
major components under a crowdfunding scheme. In Section 3, I attempt to understand
the predictions from the model by examining the results from a specific numerical example.
Section 4 discusses potential extensions of the model that can be used to study issues such
as moral hazard, asymmetric information, and motivations, etc. Limitations of the model
are also briefly discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Simple Model
2.1 The Funders
Following Strausz (2016) binary-type-consumer model, I consider two types of funders: fun-
der i who values the product, vi = 1, or not, vi = 0. I refer in the following texts funders with
valuation 1 as type-1 funders and valuation 0 as type-0. Furthermore, I assume the crowd
is uncoordinated, and funder forms her valuation based solely on the product produced by
the creator. In particular, I consider funders’ valuations to be i.i.d. with Pr{v = 1} = p
and Pr{v = 0} = 1 − p, where p ∼ beta(a, b) is commonly held among all funders. Us-
ing β-distribution to model funders’ valuations has several major advantages compared to
other probability distributions. For example, the Bayesian updating rule for β-distribution
is straightforward. A proof can be found in Navarro and Perfors (2005). It works as follows:
starting with common prior beta(a, b), after receiving k successes in n trials, the posterior
belief becomes beta(a+ k, b+n− k). Another advantage is that I could use BetaBinomialD-
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istribution to model the number of type-1 funders in the population. A brief discussion of
this distribution can also be found in Navarro and Perfors (2005).
To further simplify the analysis, I separate the crowd of funders into two distinct pop-
ulations. Specifically, I denote n as the total number of funders who do not surf on the
crowdfunding platform and n1 as the number of type-1 funders in this population. In other
words, funders in this population are effectively consumers who do not perform any ”fund-
ing” behaviors and do not have any information about the product until the creator is able
to initialize her project by garnering enough early capitals from the crowdfunding platform.
Equivalently, the creator will never reach this population of funders if she fails to initialize
her project. The rest of the funders in the crowd is denoted by m, who are regular visitors
to the crowdfunding platform, and m1 denotes the number of type-1 funders in this popu-
lation. Unlike the funders in the other population, funders in the crowdfunding population
can decide whether or not to fund the creator based on their valuation of the product and
corresponding updated belief of the probability p, which I will study in Section 4. Lastly, as
a note, I define the funder’s utility to equal her total returns derived from interacting with
the creators.
2.2 The Creators
In one of the fundamental papers about crowdfunding, Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb
(2014) outlined two major incentives for creators to use crowdfunding for raising early cap-
itals: 1). lower cost of capital, and 2). accessibility to more information. In the simple
model, I include the third incentive for creators by assuming they are credit-constrained: 3).
to initialize the project. The credit-constraint assumption stipulates that even in the best
case scenario, where all m funders in the crowdfunding population are type-1, the creator is
still unable to fund her project if every funder only contributes her valuation, i.e. m ∗ 1 < I,
where I denotes the entry cost. Therefore, the creator needs to set up a bid x > 1 on the
platform to overcome this constraint. And to compensate to the funders who are willing
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to bid more than their valuations for the product, the creator will return an α share of the
profits she will earn from the non-crowdfunding population if the project gets initialized. In
particular, α is set to be a fixed proportion of the profits the creator commits to return-
ing to each bidding funder. It follows naturally that the initialization of a project requires
x∗T ≥ I, where T is the number of bidders needed in the crowdfunding population and x is
the bid. Once the project is initialized, I impose that the creator commits to carry out the
plan and is able to reach the whole non-crowdfunding population wherein she can maximize
accordingly. In addition, I also assume that the creator has no other funding options besides
the crowdfunding platform. Lastly, without loss of generality, I assume the marginal cost of
production equals 0 for the creator.
2.3 The Platform
Based on the aforementioned characteristics of the creators and funders, the crowdfunding
platform I am proposing combines both reward crowdfunding and equity crowdfunding. On
the platform, the funder can receive both the product and future monetary returns if she
is willing to fund the creator x. The creator sets up T, α, and x to overcome her credit
constraint and to initialize the project. In particular, the platform adopts a simple threshold
mechanism where the creator wants to maximize her ex-ante expected profits, and the funder
decides whether to bid based on the threshold T the creator sets, the equity share α the
creator commits to returning, the bid x > 1 the creator proposes, and her updated belief
about others’ preferences.
2.4 Objective and Constraints
In the simple model, the creator’s objective is to maximize her ex-ante expected utility
subject to various constraints. But first of all, let me assume the creator is just like all the
funders regarding the potential success of the project: the creator shares the funders’ common
prior belief about p. Moreover, apart from the credit constraint, which stipulates x ∗ T ≥ I,
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I also require incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Let ui(·) denote the utility
type-i funder derives by bidding to the project. Specifically, incentive compatibility indicates
E[u0(0)] = 0 and E[u1(x)] ≥ 0, and individual rationality demands E[u1(x)] ≥ E[u1(0)] and
E[u0(0)] ≥ E[u0(x)]. I can combine the two constraints into a more compact form:
E[u1(x)] ≥ E[u1(0)] = 0 = E[u0(0)] ≥ E[u0(x)]
The objective function for the creator is
arg max
α,T,x
E[π] = Pr(m1 ≥ T ) · E[(xm1 − I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ (1− α ∗m1)(pn · 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
|m1 ≥ T ] (1)
where 1 is the profits from the bidding funders in the crowdfunding population and 2 is the
profits from the non-crowdfunding population after paying back the bidding funders’ equity
earnings. Similarly, I can write the expected utility for type-i funder as:
E[ui(x)|vi] = Pr(m1 ≥ T − 1|vi) · E[ui|vi ∩m1 ≥ T − 1] (2)
E[ui(0)|vi] = 0, for i = 0,1 (3)
where the T −1 term in equation (2) is resulted from funder i being the bidder, and equation
(3) holds directly from incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
Expanding the utility functions and maximizing the objective function involve proper
updating of beliefs from all crowdfunding participants. I will illustrate this point through a
simple numerical example discussed in the following section.
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3 A Simple Numerical Example and Results
3.1 Model Parameterization and Solution Concept
Imagine a simple world with n = 200 and m = 16. And the creator shares the common prior
that p ∼ F = β(1, 1) with all the funders and faces I = 20. Starting from the crowdfunding
funder’s perspective, upon forming her valuation of the product, the funder correspondingly
updates her belief of p either to F+ = beta(2, 1) if she is type-1 or to F− = beta(1, 2) if type-
0. When calculating the expected ex-ante utilities for all crowdfunding participants, as in
Section 3, the equations depend on the realized number of type-1 funders in the crowdfunding
population. In particular, the project will not be initialized ifm < T . Therefore, conditioning
on the project being initialized, i.e. m1 ≥ T , all funders as well as the creator update their
beliefs once again:
Using BetaBin(·,·,·) to denote the BetaBinomial Distribution, I get:
Creator:

PDF (p|m1 ≥ T ) = PDF (p)·Pr(m1≥T |p)Pr(m1≥T ) Posterior PDF for p




PDF (p|m1 ≥ T ) = PDF (p)·Pr(m1≥T−1|p)Pr(m1≥T−1) Posterior PDF for p




PDF (p|m1 ≥ T ) = PDF (p)·Pr(m1≥T |p)Pr(m1≥T ) Posterior PDF for p
(F−, Bin(m− 1, p), BetaBin(1, 2,m− 1)) Distributions of (p,m1|p,m1)
(6)
Since type-1 funder knows her own valuation, from her perspective, the project only needs at
least T − 1 more type-1 funders to initialize. The similar rationale applies to the m− 1 term
shown up in the above belief system. Moreover, when calculating the probability term, I
have to use the correct funder-type-specific distribution for m1. Based on this belief system,
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I can calculate each type of funder’s ex-ante expected payoff:
E[u1(x)] = Pr(m1 < T − 1) · 0 + Pr(m1 ≥ T − 1) · E[u1|m1 ≥ T − 1] (7)
= Pr(m1 ≥ T − 1) · ((1− x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
+ (α ∗ n ∗ E(p|p ∼ PosteriorP in Eq(5))︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
) (8)
where 3 indicates the disutility type-1 funder gets by bidding more than her valuation, and
4 gives the expected equity return from the creator. Similarly, for type-0 funder:
E[u0(x)] = Pr(m1 < T − 1) · 0 + Pr(m1 ≥ T − 1) · E[u0|m1 ≥ T − 1] (9)
= Pr(m1 ≥ T − 1) · ((0− x) + (α ∗ n ∗ E(p|p ∼ PosteriorP in Eq(6))) (10)
When maximizing the objective function (1) subject to the constraints outlined in equa-
tions (2) and (3), I consider one specific class of strategies for the creator. In particular, I
imagine that the creator is concerned with the possibility of raising enough early capitals
and therefore is unwilling to overshoot the minimum target level, I. In other words, she will
pick x and T ex-ante such that x ·T = I, which effectively reduces the set of choice variables
for the creator to only α and x (or T ). Since T ∈ [1,m], I could simply conduct a grid search
for every possible value of T and find the optimal set of maximizers for the creator.
3.2 Results and Interpretation
In Table 1, I presented the set of maximizers given every value of T and the pre-specified
parameter values. Table 2 shows the sets of maximizers if I double the size of n, holding
everything else constant. Table 3 contains the sets of maximizers if I instead increase the
value of I, holding everything else constant. Based on Table 3, one observation is that as T
grows relatively larger than the size of the crowdfunding population, m, the optimal threshold
T for the creator becomes an interior point rather than a boundary point, i.e., T = 6 instead
of 1. Table 4 with an even larger I-m ratio illustrates this point more clearly. Table 5
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displays the set of maximizers when I increase the size of the crowdfunding population m
such that the creator will no longer face a credit constraint, holding everything else constant.
Let us first look at Table 1 and keep the original model parameterization in mind. It
is immediately evident that in this class of strategies, the creator will be best off ex-ante
if she sets T = 1, x = 20, α = 14.25%. In other words, the creator will get the maximum
ex-ante expected payoff if she simply sets the bid to be equal to the entry cost, I, and only
seeks one bidder from the crowdfunding population. To obtain such a high bid, the creator
is willing to return 14.25% of the profits she earns from the non-crowdfunding population
to the bidder. One should be aware that α here is not chosen randomly but specifically to
favor the creator in the sense that she gets all the ex-ante expected social surplus from this
threshold mechanism. To see this point, one needs to make several observations.
Firstly, by conducting a grid search based on T ’s value, I effectively reduce the set
of choice variables for the creator to only α. When maximizing her objective function,
the creator only needs to choose the optimal α given T and x. The construction of the
optimization problem implies that the creator has perfect information regarding the funders’
utility functions. Since the creator could adjust any α that gives type-1 funder positive
utility in expectation for any given T and x when optimizing, the creator’s optimal α should
always make the individual rationality constraint for type-1 funder bind. In other words,
type-1 funder’s ex-ante expected utility should always be 0. With type-1 funder getting 0
ex-ante, type-0 funder will receive negative ex-ante expected payoff if she bids x because she
not only values the product less but also is more pessimistic regarding others’ preferences of
the product compared to the type-1 funder. The individual rationality constraint for type-0
funder only binds when the creator expects no type-0 funder in the crowdfunding population,
i.e. T = m.
Additionally, based on the objective function, the creator loses nothing even if the project
fails to initialize ex-post. This may help explain why the creator is willing to set such a high
bid x in the model intuitively. On the contrary, if the ex-post number of type-1 funders from
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the crowdfunding population exceeds T , the creator receives more funding than she needs.
Since the extra funding does not come from the non-crowdfunding population, the creator
does not need to return this part of endowment and could keep them for herself, unless the
total equity share held by all bidders, m1 ∗ α, exceed 1. Though the overall effect on the
creator’s ex-post utility is arbitrary because more bidders take away more of the creator’s
profits from the non-crowdfunding population, the ex-post arbitrariness is of less concern
here because I am interested in how the creator maximizes her utility ex-ante.
Once the project gets initialized, by setting the market price to be 1, the creator reaps all
the funders’ consumer surplus as every type-1 funder in the non-crowdfunding population will
buy the product. Moreover, by maximizing the objective function using the aforementioned
set of maximizers, the creator gets all the surplus from this mechanism, and the outcome
is socially optimal. The creator would not have been able to achieve this socially optimal
outcome due to the credit constraint were there no such crowdfunding platform. Though I
limited the outside funding options for the creator by assumption, one could still ask what
will happen if I instead relax this assumption to include funding from a venture capitalist.
The short answer here is that the crowdfunding mechanism should still be weakly preferred.
As predicted by the model, under the original model parameterization, the creator is best
off if she is only looking for one bidder, which sounds very much like the creator is seeking
a venture capitalist except that this venture capitalist has no bargaining power. In other
words, the bidder, or the ”venture capitalist,” that the creator seeks is expected to accept
any x and α, including those that essentially give him 0 ex-ante expected utility. In a real
life setting, one can easily imagine that almost no venture capitalist will take such a deal.
Instead, it is highly likely that the creator needs to agree on a larger α than the one from
the crowdfunding platform in exchange for the funding, resulting in less ex-ante expected
utility for the creator and thus rendering the crowdfunding platform preferable. Therefore,
the crowdfunding platform offers a way for the creator to obtain early capitals at a lower
cost.
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That the bidder is receiving 0 ex-ante expected utility may then raise the question why
anyone would accept the deal. One could understand this in two ways. Firstly, unlike the
venture capitalist, the funder does not have any bargaining power when deciding whether
to bid. All a funder has is a take-it-or-leave-it deal given by the crowdfunding platform.
Since the type-1 funder will be indifferent between bidding and not bidding because of her
0 ex-ante expected utility, I could specify the strategy for the type-1 funders to always bid
in such cases. Alternatively, the creator could leave the type-1 funder ε amount of ex-ante
expected utility by adjusting the value of α, which guarantees the bid from type-1 funders.
In summary, one could see that T = 1 being the optimal choice in this case does not imply
that the creator is looking for a venture capitalist, but rather is a result of the relationship
among I,m, and n, which will be discussed in Section 4.
Though I approached the maximization problem by conducting a grid search for the
values of T , I have not yet discussed the interpretations of these values. By setting the
threshold T to be a specific number, the creator is only willing to carry out the project if
there turns out to be more than T number of bidders in the crowdfunding sample. Essentially,
the creator is conditioning her investment choice on the demand signal she learns from the
crowdfunding population. Moreover, by assumption, she is committed to carrying out the
project once the threshold T is surpassed. Therefore, she wants to set the T optimally such
that it maximizes her ex-ante expected utility from the crowdfunding mechanism. Under
the initial model parameterization, the optimal value for T is 1, indicating that the creator
uses the crowdfunding platform more about raising early capitals than learning the potential
demand for her product. This, as one will see soon, is not always the case.
Lastly, if one ignores the optimal choice of T in Table 1 and looks at the whole table, it
is not hard to observe that the project is always profitable ex-ante for the creator for any
T . Such profitability feature implies that the creator will always want to enter the market
if she faces no credit constraints, which also helps explain why the creator cares less about
the signal she learns from the crowdfunding platform. In real life, one can expect most of
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such projects to be picked up by venture capitalists because of their profitability. But as I
discussed above, the creator may be better off if she opts for the crowdfunding platform by
retaining as much ex-ante expected utility as possible.
Moving on to Table 2, where I get the results, ceteris paribus, by doubling the size of
the non-crowdfunding population, one observation is that the values of both the creator’s
ex-ante expected utility and α have changed compared to the ones in Table 1. One can easily
predict such changes by the construction of the model. Based on the discussion above, the
creator chooses the optimal α such that all type-1 funders in the crowdfunding population
will have 0 ex-ante expected utility. Hence, by equation (8), with n doubled, the value of
optimal α for each T has to be half of the value in the original model parameterization,
whereby the ex-ante expected utility of type-1 funder can be kept to be 0. Similarly, one
can predict the change in the creator’s ex-ante expected utility. Going back to equation (1),
I could rewrite it as:
arg max
α,T,x
E[π] = Pr(m1 ≥ T ) · E[m1(x− αpn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
5
+ pn− I︸ ︷︷ ︸
6
|m1 ≥ T ] (11)
As discussed above, the optimal value of α is halved compared to what it is under the
original model, and with n doubled, the expression of 5 remains unchanged, but there
will be an extra pn from 6 . So with the modification, the change of the creator’s ex-ante
expected payoff is Pr(m1 ≥ T ) · E[p|p ∼ PosteriorP in Eq(4)]n. In general, if I scale the
non-crowdfunding population size n by a factor c, the optimal values of α will be 1
c
of
the ones in the original model, and the creator’s ex-ante expected utility will change by
Pr(m1 ≥ T ) · (c− 1)E[p|p ∼ PosteriorP in Eq(4)]n.
This modification implies that as the non-crowdfunding population size becomes larger,
holding everything else constant, the profitability of the project grows accordingly. One way
to interpret n is to treat it as an indicator of how promising objectively the project is. The
rationale behind this interpretation is that without the credit constraint, a very promising
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project will be favored by a larger crowd, corresponding to a larger n value. Intuitively, the
more promising a project is, the higher the ex-ante expected payoff for the creator will be,
which is exactly what the model predicts. Moreover, because of the project’s high potential
for profitability, the creator does not need to offer a large equity share, α, in exchange for
the early funding, which is captured by the smaller α values in Table 2.
So far, I in the model only denotes the entry cost. However, since the creator also
devotes time and efforts to the project during the preparation process, this preliminary cost
structure may not be sufficient. Therefore, one rationale behind having a larger I is to
consider that the creator will internalize the preparation cost while looking for funding in
order to compensate for her own efforts. Such internalization should then correspond to the
increased value of I as I now represents the total investment cost. Table 3 and 4 examine
such cases while holding everything else constant.
As mentioned previously, as I grows relatively larger compared to m, the optimal T
starts deviating from the lower boundary 1. Such deviations are evident in both Table 3
and 4. The important takeaway here is that signaling effect matters, even in the case where
the project is always profitable ex-ante as in Table 3. With I = 80, the creator commits to
carrying out the project only if there is at least a reasonable amount of type-1 funders in
the crowdfunding population, which in this case is 6. Moreover, though setting any other
T also results in positive ex-ante expected payoff, T = 6 maximizes it. As discussed before,
because the creator is unable to react ex-post due to commitment, it is crucial and necessary
for her to choose optimally ex-ante. With I = 150 as in Table 4, the creator is only willing to
commit to the project if there are at least 12 type-1 funders in the crowdfunding population.
More importantly, when the total investment cost I is a lot larger compared to the size of
the crowdfunding population, one begins to see negative ex-ante expected payoff from some
threshold choices T . For example, if the creator sets T = 1 as in the original model, she has
to return 111.75% of the future profits to compensate the bidder for the large bid x and only
to make the bidder indifferent, resulting in negative ex-ante expected payoff. In results not
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shown here, with I = 200, the optimal threshold T becomes 16, corresponding to the only
positive ex-ante expected payoff for the creator, which is less than 1. In comparison to the
results of the original model with low I, one can observe that as I grows larger, the creator
starts to care more about learning the market demand for her product from the signal sent
by the crowdfunding population. The credit-constraint becomes less of a concern because
it can always be satisfied through the crowdfunding platform. But as one can observe from
Table 4, some sets of parameter choices do not generate positive ex-ante expected payoff
for the creator. In the original model, however, it is hard to argue the importance of the
signaling effect because the optimal T equals to 1 due to the small investment cost I.
From another point of view, the creator knows ex-ante that the project is unlikely to be
profitable due to the large investment cost I and relatively small crowd m+n = 216. Suppose
there were no credit constraint, it would still have required at least 150 type-1 funders from
the non-crowdfunding population to cover the total investment cost I, which is unlikely to
happen given the creator’s belief. Therefore, she only wants to commit to the project if she
observes a promising signal from the crowdfunding population. In other words, the creator
first forms her ex-ante expected market demand that will render the project profitable and
then conditions her investment decision upon receiving such signal from the crowdfunding
platform.
Previously, I interpret n as the objective promisingness of the project. Similarly, m can
be understood as the popularity of the crowdfunding platform. The rationale is simple. If
a crowdfunding platform is popular, one should expect more regular visitors on this site.
Table 5 shows the results when I only increase m. The modified value of m = 25 implies the
possibility that the creator no longer faces a credit constraint. Indeed, by having m > T , I
observe the kink where a reward- and equity-based crowdfunding transitions into a reward
crowdfunding. In particular, by setting T = 20, the creator’s best choice is to treat the
funders in the crowdfunding pool as the funders in the non-crowdfunding pool by setting
x = v1 and α = 0. The interesting point here is that doing so does not generate the best
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ex-ante expected payoff for the creator. Since the creator could use the equity share α
given by the crowdfunding mechanism to extract more fundings from type-1 funders in the
crowdfunding population, it is to the creator’s interest to set lower T to utilize the equity
feature and to maximize her ex-ante expected payoff. Indeed, as one can see from Table 5,
the optimal set of maximizers is T = 2, x = 10, α = 6.7315.
A very important implication of setting a low threshold T that I have not yet discussed
is that it implies a very high bid x. This relationship is caused by the specific class of
strategies I am working with, where I imposed T ∗ x = I. As discussed before, the credit
constraint can always be satisfied by having a specific set of maximizers for a given T . And
the number of bidders in the crowdfunding population will be the number of type-1 funders,
whose bidding decisions depend on x and α but valuations do not. Since for a given T , the
set of maximizers x and α always induces all type-1 funders to bid, therefore, as long as
ex-ante an extra bid gives more payoff than the expected equity cost, the creator has an
incentive to set T low. This argument perhaps is more rigorous compared to the raising-
capital argument I discussed earlier when justifying the optimal choice of T = 1 under the
original model parameterization. But as one can see from Table 4, where the equity cost
gives more disutility than the utility given by the high bid ex-ante, choosing a larger T
that makes the high-equity-cost effect dissipate is more preferable. In Table 5, with low
investment cost, a low threshold T implies a high bid x and a small equity share α, which,
by the above argument, should be preferred by the creator. Indeed, T = 2 offers the highest
ex-ante expected payoff for the creator, and the ex-ante expected payoffs given by other low
thresholds T do not differ much from the optimal value.
What role does m play here? Firstly, having a larger m means that the creator can
expect more type-1 funders from the crowdfunding population. Therefore, as long as the
above argument holds, the creator should expect a higher ex-ante payoff from a more popular
platform for the same level of threshold because of the potential for more bidders. Indeed, by
comparing the results from Table 1 and 5, I find that the creator gets more ex-ante expected
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payoffs for all T ∈ [1, 16]. Secondly, a more popular platform implies that the creator can
expect more accurate demand signal from the crowdfunding population. Suppose in an
extreme case, the size of the crowdfunding population is 2. Upon observing one bidder from
the crowdfunding population, the creator should not be confident to expect half of the non-
crowdfunding population to be type-1 funders because of the small sample size. Thirdly, all
the funders in a popular crowdfunding population incorporate the results that the creator
is able to expect more bidders and receive more accurate demand information into their
utility functions, and therefore should demand higher equity shares α for revealing their
private information. The model indeed predicts such behaviors by higher α values in Table
5. Lastly, the value of m also affects the optimal choice of T , as one already sees in Table 5.
A suggested approximate formula will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.
3.3 Summary of Results
By examining the original model parameterization and comparing the original results with
other results given by different modified model parameterizations, the model makes several
interesting predictions. (1). The credit constraint can always be satisfied via the equity
and reward crowdfunding platform. (2). The platform offers lower cost of capital. (3) The
socially optimal outcome can be achieved by the platform and the creator receives all the
expected social surplus ex-ante. (4) With an objectively promising project, the creator is able
to raise funding with a small equity share. (5) With a higher investment cost by which the
project may not always be profitable ex-ante, the creator conditions her investment decision
on successful observation of the expected demand signal from the crowdfunding platform. (6)
A popular platform offers more accurate demand signal. (7) The creator expects higher ex-
ante expected utility from a more objectively promising project and a more popular platform.
(8) When facing a highly profitable project implied by a low I-n ratio, the creator cares less
about learning the demand and thus setting a low threshold for initializing the project. (9)
When setting the optimal threshold, the creator weights an additional bid against the equity
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cost of acquiring it.
In the next section, I will revisit some of the results discussed here and look at some
other potential extensions and limitations of the model.
4 Extensions and Limitations
4.1 Cost Structure
In the discussion of the results from the original model parameterization, I mentioned that
the creator loses nothing even if the project fails to initialize. One can also see this feature
from the objective function (1) by observing that the objective function implicitly specifies
the utility to be 0 whenever m1 < T . This, however, could not be possibly true in real life.
The creator’s internalization of her preparation cost into a higher I also does not solve this
problem, because the higher I only factors into the creator’s utility function whenever the
project could be initialized given specific T . One simple modification would be adding a
”frustration cost”, F , into the objective function. This cost is only present when the project
fails to initialize, whereby the creator gets frustrated by her fruitless efforts. I can thus
rewrite the objective function as:
arg max
α,T,x
E[π] = −F ·Pr(m1 < T ) +Pr(m1 ≥ T ) ·E[(xm1− I) + (1−α ∗m1)(pn · 1)|m1 ≥ T ]
(12)
For illustration purpose, I set F = I using the original model parameterization and Table 6
shows the result. The immediate observation is that the frustration cost has little effect on
the expected utility for T small, but large negative effects for T large. Because the realization
of the number of type-1 funders in the crowdfunding population is totally independent of
x, α, and T , the larger the threshold T is, the less likely the ex-post realization will surpass
it and therefore the more likely the creator incurs the frustration cost. In this way, I could
interpret F also as the cost for expecting high signals from the crowdfunding population,
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reflecting the saying that ’the higher the expectations, the greater the disappointment.’ In
results not shown, using F = 30 and under Table 4’s model parameterization, the addition
renders the project totally unprofitable. Because it is somewhat arbitrary what the right
number of F should be, this modification was not included in the original model.
4.2 Change of the α Definition
In the original model, I defined α to be a fixed proportion of future profits the creator
commits to returning to each bidding funder. Alternatively, I can define α to be a fixed
proportion of future profits that will be shared by all bidding funders. By this definition,
the objective function (1) and funders’ utility functions (7) and (9) will become:
arg max
α,T,x
E[π] = Pr(m1 ≥ T ) · E[(xm1 − I) + (1− α)(pn · 1)|m1 ≥ T ] (13)
E[u1(x)] = Pr(m1 ≥ T − 1) · E[(1− x+ pn ∗
α
m1 + 1
)|m1 ≥ T − 1] (14)
E[u0(x)] = Pr(m1 ≥ T − 1) · E[(0− x+ pn ∗
α
m1 + 1
)|m1 ≥ T − 1] (15)
where as with equation (8) and (10), despite equation (14) and (15) look alike, the random
variables m1 and p follow the funder-type-specific distributions.
Results are shown in Table 7 using the alternative definition of α. It should not be
surprising that both α definitions give the same ex-ante expected payoff for the creator.
After all, the creator maximizes her ex-ante expected utility by extracting all the funders’
information rent from the crowdfunding population as well as all the consumer surplus from
the non-crowdfunding population. Therefore, regardless of how she hands back the equity
share to the bidders, the optimal ex-ante expected payoff should not be changed (within
the specific class of strategies considered here). Because the original version of α makes the
interpretation of results more intuitive and can be computed more efficiently, it is adopted
in the model.
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4.3 Choice of Optimal T
Based on the discussion in Section 3, if a project is objectively promising and is launched on
a popular crowdfunding platform, the creator will set a low threshold T for initializing the
project facing a low investment cost I. It turns out that one could approximately calculate
the optimal threshold T by the following formula:
T ∗ ≈ m · I
m+ n (16)
Since m is relatively small in the original model, therefore I concluded at the end of Section
3 that a low I-n ratio implies high profitability. A more precise, yet still approximate,
statement should be a low I–(n+m) ratio implies high profitability. One way to understand
this approximation is that the creator forms her ex-ante expected demand signal based on
the entire crowd with size m+n as if there were no credit constraint. This formula makes it
easy and convenient to understand the relative importance between the signaling effect and
the funding opportunity offered by the crowdfunding platform based on different parameter
constellations. Since the model can be completely represented by closed forms, an exact
formula could be derived, but the implication should not differ significantly.
4.4 Optimism and Pessimism
Another advantage of using β-distribution to model the belief system is that it enables one
to model the confidence level of the participants in the model. For example, a prior belief of
β(10, 1) implies the agent is extremely optimistic regarding the project’s potential success,
and similarly β(1, 10) indicates pessimistic attitudes. Moreover, a prior belief of β(10, 10)
is different from a prior belief of β(1, 1) in the sense that the participant with a prior belief
of β(10, 10) would not alter her expectation of others’ preferences upon observing her own
type as much as she would with a prior belief of β(1, 1). In general, the larger the value of a
and b, the more persistent the prior belief will be after the funder forms her own valuation.
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For illustration purposes, Table 8 shows the results when I change the common prior to
be β(10, 10). It is immediately evident that the ex-ante expected creator payoff for any T is
extremely close to the others. This observation is a result of the persistence of the funders’
prior beliefs given large a and b. As a result, after forming their own valuations, both type-1
funders and type-0 funders only slightly adjust their expectation of others’ preferences. The
slightly larger α values compared to those in Table 1 are resulted from the lower degree of
optimism from type-1 funders with the prior belief of β(10, 10), whereby the creator has
to agree on more generous terms in exchange for the bids. The original model uses β(1, 1)
as the common prior because the uniform distribution is hugely preferred in modeling and
makes the results more interesting.
Another modification using the β-distribution is to model asymmetric beliefs between the
creator and the funders. In the original model, I assumed that the creator shares the funders’
common prior belief; however, in real life, it is more likely that the creator is more confident
and optimistic than her targeted population regarding the potential success of her project.
In contrast to n denoting the project being objectively promising, I define the project to be
subjectively promising whenever the creator has a prior belief β(a, b) with a > b.
For illustration purposes, Table 9 contains the results when the creator holds a prior
belief β(5, 1). Comparing with the results using the original model parameterization, one
can observe that all the ex-ante expected creator payoff go up except for the case where
T = 1. The change also alters the optimal choice of T . Such changes match the real world
in the sense that one would expect an optimistic creator to be fairly confident in her project,
which can be reflected by her expecting higher ex-ante payoffs. But such optimism may lead
to failed initialization if the actual funders do not hold similar views towards the project.
This potential pitfall is captured by the model. Having the optimal T = 7 in this case, the
creator’s objective optimism induces her to believe that it is highly possible that there will
be seven type-1 funders in the crowdfunding population, which will likely not match the
reality and abort the profitable project.
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4.5 Relaxation of Commitment Constraint
One important constraint I set up for the creator in the model is the commitment constraint.
In particular, I do not allow the creators to react ex-post after she learns the signal from
the crowdfunding population. It is likely that the ex-ante choice of T is not optimal based
on the demand signal the creator learns ex-post, especially in the case where the creator is
over-optimistic. By relaxing the commitment constraint and allowing the creator to react ex-
post, I need to worry about the potential issue with moral hazard. If a threshold is surpassed
and the creator is able to overcome the credit constraint but learns a poor demand signal
from the crowdfunding population, she may abort the project and take the money away. As
mentioned in Section 2, Strausz (2016) studies this issue in depth using mechanism design
approach. For now, this relaxation is reserved for future research.
Apart from the threat of moral hazard, relaxing the commitment constraint makes the
model match more closely to the real world, where one observes many creators use crowd-
funding platforms not primarily for raising capitals. Being able to react ex-post, the creators
can adjust their investment decision, products features, and even financing strategies based
on the feedback they get from the early adopters in the crowdfunding population. Since such
adjustments are hard to model and often happen on a case by case basis, empirical studies
are more fitting for research in this area.
4.6 Robustness and Weird Cases
Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2014) made an observation in their paper that funding from
the creator’s friends and family plays a key role in the creator’s capital raising campaign.
Suppose these people support the creator via the crowdfunding platform, then the i.i.d.
assumption and the construction of funders’ valuations will be violated, because being a
member of the creator’s family or the creator’s friend will immediately imply the funder is
a bidder regardless of her actual valuation. This violation will in turn render the demand
signal from the crowdfunding platform noisy and inaccurate. Fortunately, the model can
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withstand such cases by decreasing I by an amount that is equivalent to the early funding
the creator receives from her friends and family.
Weird results may arise when I consider asymptotic cases. For example, the model breaks
down when I allow n to go to infinity because the crowdfunding mechanism will no longer
be able to restrict the type-0 funders from bidding because of the infinite ex-ante expected
payoff from the infinite non-crowdfunding population. The creator thus cannot learn any
meaningful demand signal which she does not need because the project is guaranteed to be
profitable by the infinite degree of objective promisingness. Another case I can consider is
when m goes to infinity. Based on the discussion in Section 3, the creator will no longer face
the credit constraint but always have to commit to the project because the threshold T will
always be surpassed for finite T .
4.7 Other Extensions and Limitations
One major limitation in the results is how I solve for the maximizers. Though I made
the calculation of the maximizers much more tractable by considering the creator to be
precautionary and thus unwilling to overshoot the target, it is not clear at all whether such
approaches indeed give the optimal set of maximizers when I allow x ∗T > I. A preliminary
examination shows that whenever m < I, the approach indeed offers the optimal set of
maximizers. When m > I, the weird bid value x I found in Table 5’s last 5 columns will
be gone. The optimal bid will instead be 1. The implication from the preliminary check
is that setting x according to x ∗ T = I, which is the ”safest” strategy for the creator, is
always better than trying to overshoot the desired target. This feature of the model, if it is
indeed true, protects the funders to some degree from bidding the amounts that are more
than what the creator needs.
Another limitation of the model is the binary-type-funder set-up. Relaxing this feature
of the model and allowing for multiple types of funders would be a major extension of
the model, which would also be a major extension for the Strauzs (2016) model. And if I
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allow the number of types to go to infinity, eventually I am dealing with an elastic demand.
In that case, three other things will change in the model. First, the relationship between
valuation and bidding choice will break down. In other words, having an elastic demand
uncouples the relationship between being bidders and having high valuations, because facing
an elastic demand, a threshold mechanism does not appear to be optimal among all possible
mechanisms upon a first look. Second, the creators will no longer receive all social surplus
ex-ante. The funders will always have some information rents left for themselves with an
elastic demand curve. The real life observation that many creators often set up a price
menu for the funders to choose from indicates the creators, recognizing an elastic demand,
are trying to extract as much information rent from the funders as possible. Lastly, the
distribution I used for modeling the valuation system will not be suitable anymore under an
elastic demand framework. This extension will be a major improvement and is reserved for
future research.
In the original model, when updating the crowdfunding participants’ beliefs, I only per-
form one step Bayesian update. This implicitly implies that all funders cannot see how many
bidders are already there when they determine whether to bid or not. The platform essen-
tially applies a blind bidding scheme, where no participant is able to observe the progress of
the capital raising activity for this project unless the project gets initialized. If I relax this
feature and allow for multiple updates for the funders’ beliefs regarding others preferences,
I will be able to study the potential herding behaviors and bystander effects based on the
observation made by Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2014). They concluded in their pa-
per that ”funding propensity increases with accumulated capital and may lead to herding”,
and there is also a possibility one observes ”a reduction in the propensity to fund by new
individuals because of the perception that the target will be reached regardless.”
One more extension I can make is to consider a nonlinear relationship between α and
x. This implies the platform is able to let the creator set multiple bid levels x and allow
for different α for each individual bid level x. This is more suitable in a case where there
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exist multiple types of funders, and essentially this extension is like offering a price menu in
a reward crowdfunding case. For a study like this, one can turn to the paper written by Hu,
Li, and Shi (2015).
5 Conclusion
In this thesis, I set up a model examining the possible implications of the recent trend
that reward crowdfunding platforms start to partner with equity crowdfunding platforms.
Based on the Strauzs (2016) model, the model studied the case where the creator faces a
credit constraint and is unable to reach the entire market in the first place. The model
constructs a platform which combines both reward-based crowdfunding and equity-based
crowdfunding, and assumes the creator is able to set up an initialization rule which includes
a threshold number of bidders, T , a bid x, and an equity share α. Using β distribution to
model the funders valuations, I found several interesting results from the model. First of
all, the credit constraint will always be satisfied, and when the investment cost is relatively
small compared to the entire market size, the creator can reap all the expected social surplus
ex-ante, and the result is socially optimal. Secondly, the platform is able to offer lower cost
of capital which helps the creator overcome her initial credit constraint, and a demand signal
which will be more accurate with a larger size of crowdfunding population. Thirdly, facing
a higher investment cost which makes the project not always profitable ex-ante, the creator
conditions her investment choice on successful observation of her expected demand signal
ex-ante, provided that the creator is not allowed to adjust her investment decision ex-post.
Additionally, the equity stake by which the creator induces the high type funders to bid
plays an important role when the creator decides what the optimal threshold is. The creator
weights the value from an extra bid against the equity cost of acquiring it when she sets up
the threshold. Moreover, a project being objectively promising is very different from being
subjectively promising, in the sense that the creator is likely to set herself up for failure
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in the latter case even in the case where the project is always profitable ex-ante. Lastly,
the model predicts that how the creator gives back the equity does not affect the creator’s
ex-ante optimal choice or her ex-ante expected utility.
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Appendix A
Major Crowdfunding Platforms in North America and Europe
Name Funding Strategy InitializationRule Other Features
Indiegogo Reward Both Partnered with MircroVentures
Kickstarter Reward Fixed N/A
Patreon Reward Flexible Aiming at artists and innovators
RocketHub Reward Flexible Partnered with Bankroll Ventures
PledgeMusic Reward Both N/A
Crowd Supply Reward Fixed Aiming at Tech-related Projects
Experiment Reward Fixed Aiming at Scientific Research
EquityEats Reward Flexible Gift Cards as Reward for Restaurant
Fundable Reward & Equity Fixed N/A
MicroVentures Equity N/A Partnership with Indiegogo
CircleUp Equity N/A N/A
Crowdfunder Equity N/A N/A
Grow VC Equity N/A N/A
Angel List Equity N/A N/A
SeedInvest Equity N/A N/A
EquityNet Equity N/A N/A
RealtyMogul Equity N/A Real Estates Related
Generosity by
Indiegogo Donations Flexible 0 Platform Fee
GoFundMe Donations Flexible N/A
Crowdrise Donations Flexible No Deadlines
YouCaring Donations Flexible N/A
FundRazr Donations Flexible N/A
DonorsChoose Donations Flexible Build Classrooms, Schools, Buses forChildren
YouCaring Donations Flexible N/A
Plumfund Donations Flexible N/A
GiveForward Donations Flexible N/A
Kiva Debt Flexible N/A
Funding Circle Debt Flexible Aiming at Small Business
KickFurther Debt Flexible Aiming at Small Business
Bolstr Debt Flexible N/A
Lending Clubs Debt Flexible N/A
Prosper Debt Flexible N/A
RealtyShares Debt & Equity Flexible Resturauants-Specific
Patch of Land Debt Flexible Resturauants-Specific
SellABand* Reward Fixed Bankrupted
* Used to be popular
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Table 1: Results using Original Model Parameterization
With n = 200,m = 16, I = 20
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
*88.5229* *1* *20* *14.25*
88.3333 2 10 6.7086
87.4314 3 6.6667 4.1767
85.8170 4 5 2.9032
83.4902 5 4 2.1369
80.4510 6 3.3333 1.6268
76.6993 7 2.8571 1.2646
72.2353 8 2.5 0.9959
67.0588 9 2.2222 0.7902
61.1699 10 2 0.6290
54.5686 11 1.8182 0.5004
47.2549 12 1.6667 0.3962
39.2288 13 1.5385 0.3109
30.4902 14 1.4286 0.2404
21.0392 15 1.3333 0.1816
10.8758 16 1.25 0.1324
* Maximum Ex-ante Creator Expected Utility and Set of Maximizers
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Table 2: Results using Modified Model Parameterization
With n = 400,m = 16, I = 20
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
*187.869* *1* *20* *7.125*
186.373 2 10 3.3543
183.510 3 6.6667 2.0884
179.281 4 5 1.4516
173.686 5 4 1.0685
166.725 6 3.3333 0.8134
158.399 7 2.8571 0.6323
148.706 8 2.5 0.4980
137.647 9 2.2222 0.3951
125.222 10 2 0.3145
111.431 11 1.8182 0.2502
96.2745 12 1.6667 0.1981
79.7516 13 1.5385 0.1555
61.8627 14 1.4286 0.1202
42.6078 15 1.3333 0.0908
21.9869 16 1.25 0.0662
* Maximum Ex-ante Creator Expected Utility and Set of Maximizers
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Table 3: Results using Modified Model Parameterization
With n = 200,m = 16, I = 80
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
32.0523 1 80 59.25
35.3922 2 40 29.0706
38.0196 3 26.6667 18.9181
39.9346 4 20 13.7903
41.1373 5 16 10.6847
*41.6275* *6* *13.3333* *8.5986*
41.4052 7 11.4286 7.1010
40.4706 8 10 5.9754
38.8235 9 8.8889 5.1006
36.4641 10 8 4.4032
33.3922 11 7.2727 3.8363
29.6078 12 6.6667 3.3679
25.1111 13 6.1538 2.9760
19.9020 14 5.7143 2.6444
13.9804 15 5.3333 2.3613
7.3464 16 5 2.1176
* Maximum Ex-ante Creator Expected Utility and Set of Maximizers
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Table 4: Results using Modified Model Parameterization
With n = 200,m = 16, I = 150
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
-33.8301 1 150 111.75
-26.3725 2 75 55.1595
-19.6275 3 50 36.1164
-13.5948 4 37.5 26.4919
-8.2745 5 30 20.6570
-3.6667 6 25 16.7324
0.2288 7 21.4286 13.9102
3.4118 8 18.75 11.7848
5.8824 9 16.6667 10.1293
7.6405 10 15 8.8065
8.6863 11 13.6364 7.7281
*9.0196* *12* *12.5* *6.8349*
8.6405 13 11.5385 6.0853
7.5490 14 10.7143 5.4491
5.7451 15 10 4.9043
3.2288 16 9.375 4.4338
* Maximum Ex-ante Creator Expected Utility and Set of Maximizers
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Table 5: Results using Modified Model Parameterization
With n = 200,m = 25, I = 20
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
92.9843 1 20 14.25
*93.1453* *2* *10* *6.7315*
92.9829 3 6.6667 4.2165
92.4972 4 5 2.9547
91.688 5 4 2.1958
90.5556 6 3.3333 1.6895
89.0997 7 2.8571 1.3283
87.3205 8 2.5 1.0585
85.2179 9 2.2222 0.85
82.792 10 2 0.6848
80.0427 11 1.8182 0.5513
76.9701 12 1.6667 0.4416
73.5741 13 1.5385 0.3505
69.8547 14 1.4286 0.2741
65.812 15 1.3333 0.2093
61.4459 16 1.25 0.1541
56.7564 17 1.1765 0.1067
51.7436 18 1.1111 0.0660
46.4074 19 1.0526 0.0307
40.7479 20 1 0
34.5543 21 0.9524 0
28.13 22 0.9091 0
21.4679 23 0.8697 0
14.562 24 0.8333 0
7.40741 25 0.8 0
* Maximum Ex-ante Creator Expected Utility and Set of Maximizers
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Table 6: Results using Modified Model Parameterization
With n = 200,m = 16, I = 20, F = 10
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
*87.3464* *1* *20* *14.25*
85.9804 2 10 6.7086
83.9020 3 6.6667 4.1767
81.1111 4 5 2.9032
77.6078 5 4 2.1369
73.3922 6 3.3333 1.6268
68.4641 7 2.8571 1.2646
62.8235 8 2.5 0.9959
56.4706 9 2.2222 0.7902
49.4052 10 2 0.6290
41.6275 11 1.8182 0.5004
33.1373 12 1.6667 0.3962
23.9346 13 1.5385 0.3109
14.0196 14 1.4286 0.2404
3.3922 15 1.3333 0.1816
-7.9477- 16 1.25 0.1324
* Maximum Ex-ante Creator Expected Utility and Set of Maximizers
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Table 7: Results using Modified Model Parameterization
With n = 200,m = 16, I = 20 and Modified α
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
*88.5229* *1* *20* *153*
88.3333 2 10 72.9
87.4314 3 6.6667 46.1429
85.8170 4 5 32.7273
83.4902 5 4 24.6522
80.4510 6 3.3333 19.25
76.6993 7 2.8571 15.3771
72.2353 8 2.5 12.4651
67.0588 9 2.2222 10.1852
61.1699 10 2 8.3571
54.5686 11 1.8182 6.8558
47.2549 12 1.6667 5.6
39.2288 13 1.5385 4.5335
30.4902 14 1.4286 3.6161
21.0392 15 1.3333 2.8182
10.8758 16 1.25 2.1177
* Maximum Ex-ante Creator Expected Utility and Set of Maximizers
33
Table 8: Results using Modified Model Parameterization
With n = 200,m = 16, I = 20, a = 10, b = 10
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
*87.9383* *1* *20* *18.1224*
87.89 2 10 8.5843
87.8739 3 6.6667 5.4049
87.8658 4 5 3.8152
87.861 5 4 2.8614
87.8578 6 3.3333 2.2256
87.8555 7 2.8571 1.7713
87.8537 8 2.5 1.4307
87.8524 9 2.2222 1.1658
87.8513 10 2 0.9538
87.8504 11 1.8182 0.7804
87.8497 12 1.6667 0.6359
87.8491 13 1.5385 0.5136
87.8486 14 1.4286 0.4088
87.8481 15 1.3333 0.3179
87.8477 16 1.25 0.2385
* Maximum Ex-ante Creator Expected Utility and Set of Maximizers
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Table 9: Results using Modified Model Parameterization
With n = 200,m = 16, I = 20, with Creator Prior β(5, 1)
Ex-ante Expected
Creator Payoff T x α (%)
87.6178 1 20 14.25
126.65 2 10 6.7086
140.039 3 6.6667 4.1767
146.821 4 5 2.9032
150.762 5 4 2.1369
153.044 6 3.3333 1.6268
*154.057* *7* *2.8571* *1.2646*
153.843 8 2.5 0.9959
152.217 9 2.2222 0.7902
148.81 10 2 0.6290
143.067 11 1.8182 0.5004
134.234 12 1.6667 0.3962
121.335 13 1.5385 0.3109
103.142 14 1.4286 0.2404
78.1394 15 1.3333 0.1816
44.492 16 1.25 0.1324
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